[2021.11.24] [CCS 2021] SmashEx: Smashing SGX Enclaves Using Exceptions

Source: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3460120.3484821 Authors: Jinhua Cui and Jason Zhijingcheng Yu. The Link of Note: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/r15aTE Contributor: Fy. Overview Intel SGX的异常处理机制目前仍依赖于OS递交异常,而一个恶意的OS可以在任何时候触发一个异常。如果runtime没有恰当地进行异常触发的保护,会导致当程序在不可信和可信区间切换时,还没有完成对寄存器的清空就被迫进行中断处理,使得受攻击者控制的寄存器值被错误地写入可信区域的栈中,甚至通过不可信的栈指针实现对Enclave memory的任意地址写以及ROP攻击。

[2021.12.1] [Usenix Security 2022] MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third Parties

Source: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.09501.pdf Authors: Guoxing Chen, and Yinqian Zhang. The Link of Note: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/S1ugcT Contributor: lt. Overview Intel SGX的attestation机制支持enclave向其他enclave证明自己的身份。为了验证enclave是否可信,enclave会将信任的enclave的measurement放入初始数据中。但是,当多个enclave需要建立信任时,它们无法同时将对方的measurement放入自己的初始数据中,因为这个行为会使已放入的measurement失效。为此,作者提出了MAGE这一解决方案。

[2021.11.10] [Security and Communication Networks 2021] Blockchain as a CA: A Provably Secure Signcryption Scheme Leveraging Blockchains

Source: https://www.hindawi.com/journals/scn/2021/6637402/ Author: Tzung-Her Chen Ting-Le Zhu Fuh-Gwo Jeng and Chien-Lung Wang Journal: Security and Communication Networks 2021 (CCF C) Download Note: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/x1uKe9 Contributor: PDH Introduction In the past decade, applying certificateless signcryption schemes to solve the higher cost of maintaining the certificate chain issued by a certificate authority (CA) has been studied. The concepts […]

[2021.11.17] [USENIX Security 2021] Sharing More and Checking Less: Leveraging Common Input Keywords to Detect Bugs in Embedded Systems

Source: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21fall-chen-libo.pdf Authors: Libo Chen, Yanhao Wang, Quanpu Cai, Yunfan Zhan1, Hong Hu, JiaqiLinghu, Qinsheng Hou, Chao Zhang, Haixin Duan, Zhi Xue Download Note: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/l1cmyY Contributor: ydh Overview IoT设备的使用越来越广泛,设备中存在的安全漏洞的影响也越来越大。IoT设备后端与用户交互往往需要通过Web,App等前端。许多嵌入式系统的漏洞都来自于Web。但是目前已有的漏洞检测方法都无法有效且高效地分析这样的web服务。这篇文章提出了一种新颖的静态污点分析的方法(SaTC),高效地检测嵌入式设备提供的web服务中的漏洞。主要检测两类IoT设备,无线路由器以及Web摄像头,这些设备为了方便管理使用往往都会有管理界面。有研究表明75%的IoT攻击都是对路由器的,Web摄像头排在第二15.2%

[2021.10.20] [NDSS 2021] Preventing and Detecting State Inference Attacks on Android

Source: http://s3.eurecom.fr/docs/ndss21_pox.pdf Author: Andrea Possemato, Dario Nisi, Yanick Fratantonio Affiliation: EURECOM Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium 2021 Download https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/Q1LDjO Contributor: yzy Overview Phishing attacks : problematic for mobile platforms. because they do not provide enough information for a user to reliably distinguish a legitimate app from a malicious app spoofing the UI of […]

[2021.09.14] [CCS 2019] OPERA: Open Remote Attestation for Intel’s Secure Enclaves

Author: Guoxing Chen, Yinqian Zhang, Ten-Hwang Lai Affiliation: The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University Conference: CCS 2019 Paper Link: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3319535.3354220 Note Link: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/S1oYKk Contributor: pdh Overview This paper presents OPERA, which is an Open Platform for Enclave Remote Attestation. Instead of completely trusting the IAS, OPERA leverage the feature […]

[2021.09.29] [EuroSys 2019] ShieldStore: Shielded In-memory Keyvalue Storage with SGX

Source: http://calab.kaist.ac.kr:8080/~jhuh/papers/kim_eurosys19_shieldst.pdf Authors: Taehoon Kim, Joongun Park, Jaewook Woo Download Note: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/aF2d4t Contributor: cyp Overview key-value数据库在云服务中非常常用,比如 Memcached和redis。key-value数据库存储key作为 index,并且支持把在内存中的data放入磁盘,进行永久的存储。利用intel SGX的技术,可以防止恶意 的云厂商对内存中数据的监听和修改。 但是intel SGX的最大限制就是它的容量,它的EPC( enclave page cash )只有128M,如果放入 enclave的数据大于128M,就会进行消耗很大的paging 操作。 所以这篇文章提出了一个可以基于于intel SGX的key-value设计ShieldStore,它在enclave里面加密每 个key-value对,当加密完成后,此时这些key-value已经受到加密性和完整性的保护,则可以把这些 key-value放入no-enclave的区域。

[2021.09.18] [USENIX Security 2021] Breaking Through Binaries: Compiler-quality Instrumentation for Better Binary-only Fuzzing

Source: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-nagy.pdf Slides: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21_slides_nagy.pdf Authors: Stefan Nagy, Anh Nguyen-Tuong, Jason D. Hiser, Jack W. Davidson, Matthew Hick Download Note: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/21uROA Contributor: ydh Overview 目前的二进制灰盒fuzz技术主要包括三种:硬件辅助追踪覆盖率,效率高但灵活性差;动态二进制模拟插桩,效率低;二进制代码重写,容易出错。这篇文章从基于源码fuzz的编译优化过程中汲取一些有效的方法策略运用在二进制fuzz的插桩中从而提高二进制fuzz的性能和有效性。

[2021.09.01] [MIDDLEWARE 2019] AccTEE: A WebAssembly-based Two-way Sandbox for Trusted Resource Accounting >

Source: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3361525.3361541?casa_token=U0LOekVX1D4AAAAA:HAT3p4fiK0r8VwKbAX95Lib256TfCZVcIT130Zxg7gSUcjn4QZh9I9eTbp0-puE6NmIfd2ZOCZUsog Authors: David Goltzsche(TU Braunschweig, Germany);Manuel Nieke(TU Braunschweig, Germany);Thomas Knauth(Intel, United States);Rüdiger Kapitza(TU Braunschweig, Germany) Download Note: https://jbox.sjtu.edu.cn/l/S11yks Contributor: lty 远程计算,例如云计算、客户端的web应用和volunteer计算。这些服务的资源计算方法依赖于infrastructure provider。这些远程计算往往需要沙箱对其进行保护,理由是:隔离主机环境免受攻击;控制和限制资源使用。通常云服务器和代码提供者相互都是不信任的。 AccTEE是一个在服务器和用户之间提供资源使用可信服务的双路沙箱。SGX+WASM,在确保代码和数据的机密性和完整性的同时,使用自动代码工具进行细粒度的资源核算。